C limate change mitigation scenarios and the models producing them have for some time been designed to inform global policy questions, notably meeting emissions constraints with least cost to society given assumptions for future trends (economic, population, societal preferences) 1, 2 . This particular category of 'science-policy' interaction is relatively mature, with governments asking the modelling community to inform on highlevel policy questions around mitigation cost and implications for climate policy decisions. Energy sector companies have similarly had a long-held interest in such modelling.
More recently, new users, collectively known as non-party stakeholders (NPSs) -that is, non-state actors: companies of all sectors, cities and subnational governments, and financial institutions including insurance -have shown a growing interest in mitigation scenarios for two major use cases.
The first (use case 1) is measurement of ambition/alignment. The Global Climate Action Agenda at the Marrakech Conference of the Parties and the emergent concept of 'science-based targets' 3 have spurred the need to measure the ambition level of commitments from NPSs using mitigation scenarios, answering questions such as 'are the actions of a company/city/investor ambitious enough to be aligned with a well below 2 °C world? ' The second (use case 2) is financial analysis (assessing climate-related financial risk and opportunity). Research showing that using all proven fossil fuels reserves is inconsistent with global climate goals 4 , and concepts such as 'unburnable carbon' and 'stranded assets' 5, 6 have made corporations, financial institutions and financial regulators keenly aware of how climate mitigation and the energy transition may affect the financial performance of companies and associated investments. For example, recently the Financial Stability Board's Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) identified different types of risk (energy transition risk, physical climate risk, legal risk) and encouraged disclosure of companies' projected financial performance under different climate scenarios, "including a 2 °C or lower scenario" 7 . Naturally, these new users have different needs from the 'typical customers' of scenario producers: the IPCC, UNFCCC, UNEP and other policy-oriented users. This Comment explores these differences and how mitigation scenario producers can meet the diverse needs of these new user communities, with a focus on mitigation in energy systems and related 'transition risk' 7 to companies and financial institutions. By going beyond their work at the science-policy interface to also include the 'science-industry' interface, mitigation and energy system modellers can help inform the near-and long-term strategies of the critical players who are driving the low-carbon transformation.
Differences in new user needs
Much like different users in the policy community, the needs of NPSs from climate scenarios are diverse. However, some general commonalities can be noted for each use case.
At the highest level, ambition/alignment measurement (use case 1) is primarily a normative question, essentially measuring the extent to which an actor has done their 'fair share' of mitigation. It is thus closely aligned with traditional climate policy considerations of temporal, sectoral and regional burden sharing. Important considerations for mitigation scenarios include:
• Preferences on overall goals, such as limiting warming to 1.5 °C versus 2 °C.
• The timing and aggressiveness of emissions reductions in different regions and sectors, which depends on many factors, including population and macroeconomic growth assumptions 8 , technology options across sectors 9 and differing degrees of ambition 10 .
• The extent of burden sharing across public and private actors (for example, the proportion of global investment needs 11 that could be provided by public banks versus private investors).
• Reliance on controversial technologies and behaviour shifts (for example, whether scenarios include high penetration of nuclear, biofuels or CO 2 removal (CDR) 12, 13 ).
Climate-related risk analysis (use case 2) is instead a business question asking how individual companies and markets will operate in the future. This includes concerns with both the supply side (for example, global oil markets and regional land markets) and the consumer demand side of energy systems 14 and food systems 13 . Assessing transition risk requires estimating how specific companies' products, revenues, costs and capital structure will be affected by the policy, technology and societal changes in the markets they operate in. There will be business winners and losers from climate change. Which companies are which depends on their asset and product bases and adaptive strategies in the face of change 15 . Table 1 summarizes how different users and use cases drive specific needs from mitigation scenarios. In several core areas, these new users and use cases require different outputs from scenario developers that at present are not always publicly available.
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Parameters of interest
Many of the specific output parameters of interest are similar for policy and ambition measurement (for example, emissions, energy production and consumption -all by country/region and sector, and over time), but transition risk assessment also requires detailed parameters that are inputs or less commonly reported outputs of scenario modelling. For example, technoeconomic assumptions regarding investment and fuel costs, sector-specific policy constraints, and detailed production levels or capital stock additions and retirements may also be required 11 .
Geographical and sectoral scope. Focusing on policy naturally requires analysis for political regions (global/country), whereas ambition assessment and especially transition risk assessment are more appropriate for economic regions or markets, which can be local, national or global. While not problematic for cities and subnational governments, the heterogeneous nature of companies and their competitors creates complexity. For example, a pure-play coal-mining company in Germany faces very different risks than a diversified miner in India, though they might be classified in the same sector.
Time horizons. NPSs can have different time horizons, particularly for financial analysis, aligned with various business and investment cycles (commonly 1-5 years, with certain decisions 10-20 years) 16 . This requires further detail over short-term horizons compared with decadal-scale climate mitigation policy planning running to mid-century or beyond.
Transition speed and form. While climate policy is generally concerned with minimizing the cost of achieving a certain mitigation level, some stakeholders in the transition risk community, particularly financial regulators, are more concerned with the opposite -stress testing a very fast or abrupt transition, either due to policy delay 17 or unforeseen short-term changes, such as a breakthrough in energy storage 18 .
What mitigation scenarios can do today
Existing mitigation scenarios can already meet some of these new user needs. A key example is providing contextual reference points to overcome information asymmetries between companies disclosing their transition risk and the investors of those companies. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Task Force recommendations on climate risk 7 distinguished such 'disclosers' and 'users of disclosure' but provided little guidance on how users could compare scenario-based risk disclosures of different companies without reference values, particularly over the 20-40-year timeframes of typical disclosures (see Supplementary Information, Table 1 ).
Such global reference points are where peer-reviewed science can already help. Assessing the long-term implications of near-term policies has been a key research focus for some time 19 , and increasingly researchers are also assessing the near-term implications of long-term constraints (for example, on CDR 12 ). By looking at nearterm reference indicators 20 and importantly their rate of change, users of disclosure such as investors and civil society can cross-check short-term industry forecasts and estimate their long-term climate ramifications. Such benchmarks and slopes are also essential inputs to measuring the ambition of nonparty climate actions 3, 10, 12 . To illustrate this further, Fig. 1 demonstrates how existing mitigation scenarios from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) framework 8, 21 and the International Energy Agency (IEA) 22 can be used to benchmark recent scenario disclosures from major energy companies [23] [24] [25] [26] using an average rate of change over an investment horizon (20 years). Perhaps unsurprisingly, basecase scenarios from most major energy companies often align with long-term (2100) temperatures in the 3-4 °C range of the SSPs for most parameters (yellow to light red horizontal lines), while more aggressive alternative scenarios, where present, can compare similarly to ~2 °C rates of change for many global indicators. IEA scenarios, as per their design, generally follow similar rates of change to their median target levels (< 2 °C for the '2 °C scenario' (2DS) and between 1.5 °C and 2 °C for the recent 'beyond 2 °C scenario' (B2DS)).
Analysis that goes beyond such highlevel benchmarking, in particular financial analysis (use case 2), is more challenging with existing publicly available scenarios. Figure 1c shows that trends are available for some useful parameters for financial analysis, notably production/sales values for different primary energy (PE) and secondary energy (Power) commodities and technologies 11 . However, while some clear winners and losers are apparent -for example, coal-fired and renewable power -the near-term global implications for other commodities, notably natural gas, can range from a rosy outlook (3-5% growth) to a substantial near-term decline under different types of 2 °C scenarios.
Further, some risk-critical variables are not available from standard scenarios, such as capital expenditures, sales of specific types of good such as electric cars, and the self-generation of power that can eat into utility profits. Some may be available from models, but are not uniformly released, such as production of energy-intensive commodities, capital stocks and vintages, and so on. Most importantly, all variables and scenarios are likely to be needed on an annual update cycle, as the outlook for specific technologies can change quickly if their competitiveness changes 27 .
meeting the user needs of tomorrow
Several global scenario producers and projects work to provide these data, notably the Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium (IAMC), IEA and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 22, 28 . At the same time, more users are beginning to experiment with using these outputs in their work, from the Science Based Targets initiative (companies), to Deadline 2020 (cities), to several projects piloting transition risk assessment 29 . Financial regulators, industry stakeholders, and scenario builders have had several workshops in 2017 and 2018. Additional tools like the recent TCFD Knowledge Hub (https://tcfdhub.org/) are needed to make climate scenario analysis ubiquitous in these new user bases. Still, there is more work to be done.
It must be recognized that for some new use cases, a new analytical framework may be needed for certain scenario needs. For stress tests of financial stability, for instance, new approaches examining short term shocks like those taken in delayed policy scenarios 12 can help to answer 'how fast a transition could occur in the near term' rather than 'how fast it will occur' under cost minimization. Such a scenario would assess the realism of different shocks (policy or technology) and marry them to detailed short-term forecasts typical in financial analysis. This is no easy task and may take new types of multiyear collaborations between the corporate and financial communities and climate scenario researchers.
Over the shorter term, there are two key needs. First, a high-level discussion is needed to decide whose role it is to address new user needs. The global financial regulatory community (for example, FSB) and other G20-related groups such as the OECD and IEA are important stakeholders but lack the expertise required to produce scenarios on their own or do not currently have the mandate to do so. On the other hand, the IPCC and integrated assessment modelling community provide strong credibility through peer review and increasingly open model documentation and the public release of scenario data 21 , albeit for a subset of parameters. However, this research community is not wellincentivized for the type of rapid updates required by new users, or to pursue corporate collaboration more broadly.
Second, it should be noted that a 2 °C scenario is by no means a singularly definable entity. Exemplified by Fig. 1 , there are many ways to meet a carbon budget, with concomitant short-term impacts on the commodities and technologies that make up corporate revenues and investments. Thus, the type of trade-off assessments and robustness checks across model types and assumptions that multimodel intercomparisons inform on are crucial for identifying risks and defining good practice for disclosure, such as defining minimum requirements for scenario analysis disclosure.
It is clear that a continued twoway dialogue between the energy and mitigation modelling communities and their real-world users can only be mutually beneficial. It will improve modelling, assumptions and usability of mitigation scenarios for policymakers and NPSs alike, while helping the energy system modelling community to connect its output to users in the economy.
